Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution by Tyler, Tom R. & Hollander-Blumoff, Rebecca
JOURNAL OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
VOLUME 2011 NUMBER 1
SYMPOSIUM
Procedural Justice and the Rule of
Law: Fostering Legitimacy in
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler"
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... I
1. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW.............................................. 3
A. The Psychology of Procedural Justice...............................................3
B. The Rule ofLaw and Procedural Justice............................................... 8
III. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE & THE RULE OF LAW IN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
R ESOLUTION ................................................................................................. 12
A . A rbitration ............................................................................................ 13
B. M ediation............................................................................................... 15
C Negotiation ........................................... 17
IV . CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 18
I. INTRODUCTION
In the eyes of legal scholars, alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
mechanisms often show to poor advantage when compared to their judicial
counterparts, particularly on procedural fairness grounds. Owen Fiss famously
argued against the negotiated settlement of certain important disputes related to
fundamental rights,' and Deborah Hensler notably criticized the use of mediation
on the grounds that it might not appear fair to some disputants because it did not
promote a resolution based on public norms.2 Critics have suggested that a
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1. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073-75 (1984).
2. Deborah Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL.
81,95 (2002).
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judicially-based dispute resolution system that comports with the rule of law may
be fundamentally at odds with non-judicial, and therefore less formal, dispute
resolution mechanisms such as arbitration, mediation, and negotiation.3 But other
scholars have responded by suggesting that the rule of law is less in tension with
ADR than critics imagine, because they both aim to serve the same goal-the
pursuit of justice.4 This difference of opinion is aided and abetted by the fluidity
of the definition of the term "rule of law" itself, which scholars have variously
defined to include tenets as distinct as non-retroactivity,5 generality,6 certainty,7
protection of individual rights,8 and lack of discretion by government actors.9
We argue here that the tenets of the rule of law, however one may define
them, are neither irreconcilably at odds with ADR nor seamlessly reconcilable
with it. We suggest that a psychological construct, procedural justice, provides an
important perspective on how ADR systems can help maintain societal values that
are consistent with the rule of law. Just as the rule of law has historically and
philosophically been considered a central component of a legitimate governmental
system,'0 so too procedural justice is a central component of how individuals
make judgments about the legitimacy of authorities." Because procedural justice,
just like rule of law, fosters perceptions of legitimacy, we suggest that the
assessments of procedural justice by disputants in ADR systems are a critical
element in ensuring that ADR exists in harmony with rule of law values even as
ADR, by its very terms, does not produce resolutions that arise directly from the
rule of law per se. This is the case because people's everyday understanding of
what procedural justice means conforms to many of the key elements that define
the rule of law.
If people were simple, purely economic actors whose evaluation of legal
procedures was based upon the outcomes they derived from those procedures,
then individuals would evaluate their results in ADR processes based on how
favorable their outcomes were, and judgments related to the rule of law would be
irrelevant. That is, if satisfaction with ADR, which is less rule-based and
judicially regulated, was based largely on outcomes, then rule of law would
3. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathe-
ma?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 675-82 (1986) (cautioning that a virtue of adjudication is its ability to
ensure the proper resolution and application of public values, and that public officials, not private
individuals, must interpret the values of the rule of law); Fiss, supra note 1, at 1075 (arguing that
resolving disputes through settlements rather than through adjudication exchanges peace for justice);
David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622-23 (1995)
(noting that private adjudications fail to produce rules or binding precedents).
4. Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law? Lessons
from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569 (2007).
5. Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law, in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW 3-4
(Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker eds., 2009) [hereinafter Tamanaha, Concise Guide].
6. Id
7. See JOHN PHILIP REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE SEVENTEENTH
AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 5-6 (2004).
8. See, e.g., David Dyzcnhaus, Recrafting the Rule of Law, in RECRAFTiNG THE RULE OF LAW:
THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 5, 7 (1999).
9. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICs, THEORY 122-26 (2004)
[hereinafter TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW].
10. Dyzenhaus, supra note 8, at I ("The rule of law is often claimed to be one of the ingredients of
legitimate government.").
I1. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-7 (1990).
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appear not to matter in that context. However, in reality, studies consistently
suggest that people's evaluations of legal procedures, both formal and informal,
are strongly shaped by issues of procedural justice, which are the issues that are
also central to scholarly writing about the rule of law. People act as naive legal
philosophers and evaluate both their own experience and views about the general
operation of the legal system against a template of fair procedures that involves
neutrality, transparency, and respect for rights, issues that also form the basis for
the rule of law.
In Part II, we provide background on the psychology of procedural justice.
Then, because the term rule of law has been used so widely and in so many
different ways, we explain its various meanings and go on to draw connections
between the elements of procedural justice and the rule of law, highlighting both
the similarities and distinctions between the two principles. We then marshal
evidence in support of the critical role that procedural justice and rule of law
values play in fostering perceptions of legitimacy. Part III explores the links
among procedural justice, rule of law, and specific ADR processes, suggesting
particular areas of concern where attention should be given to ensure that ADR
and rule of law can coexist harmoniously.
II. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW
A. The Psychology of Procedural Justice
Procedural justice in general legal parlance refers to the fairness of a process
by which a decision is reached. In contrast, procedural justice in psychology
captures the subjective assessments by individuals 2 of the fairness of a decision
making process.' 3  Judgments about procedural justice are distinct from those
about distributive justice (the fairness of the outcome), as well as from outcome
favorability (how good the outcome is for any given party).14
A robust body of research in social psychology shows that perceptions of
procedural justice have important effects on how people think about, and behave
with respect to, the outcomes they receive in legal disputes.'s Procedural justice
drives the satisfaction that people have with their outcomes, and also predicts
future adherence to outcomes and agreements.' 6  The earliest research on the
psychology of procedural justice found that the positive effects of procedural
12. See Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCH. 117, 117-118
(2000) ("[Jlustice is a socially created concept that ... has no physical reality. It exists and is useful to
the degree that it is shared among a group of people.").
13. Throughout this article, we use the term procedural justice as defined in psychology.
14. See TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMrH & YUEN J. HUO, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 75-76 (1997) (discussing the distinctions between procedural justice,
distributive justice, and outcome favorability).
15. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST.
283, 286 (2003) (noting that "[p]rocedural justice judgments consistently emerge as the central judg-
ment shaping people's reactions to their experiences with legal authorities") [hereinafter Tom R. Tyler,
Effective Rule of Law].
16. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 63-65
(1988).
No. 1] 3
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
justice occurred in formal legal settings with third-party neutral decision makers.'7
Subsequent research demonstrated, quite emphatically, that in trials and
proceedings before other legal tribunals, procedural justice makes a significant
difference in how people evaluate their outcomes. 8 Even when people lose, they
feel better about that loss when they experience procedural fairness; conversely,
when thel win, they do not feel as good about that outcome absent procedural
fairness.'
This effect has not been limited to the civil adjudicative context; research has
suggested that even defendants in felony cases care deeply about the fairness of
the process used to determine the outcome of their cases.20 Similarly, researchers
have found procedural justice effects in the arbitration context, where an arbitrator
instead of a judge makes a decision.2'
More recently, researchers have turned their attention to other, less formal
settings like mediation and negotiation, where there is no third-party decision
maker and there are far fewer rules. In both of these areas, procedural justice
researchers have found that procedural justice drives the assessment about
satisfaction with the outcome. For example, Pruitt and his colleagues looked at
mediation from the perspectives of both parties and examined how favorable
participants felt that outcomes were and how fair they felt the process was.22
When Pruitt followed up with participants six months later, the biggest driver of
whether the parties had adhered to that mediated outcome was the procedural
fairness experienced during the mediation, rather than the favorability or fairness
of the outcome.23
In recent research, we explored procedural justice in negotiation over legal
disputes. In a study involving a simulated negotiation by law students over a
contract dispute, we found that fairness of process and fairness of treatment by the
other party, even without a third party neutral present, drives satisfaction with the
outcome and drives how enthusiastic individuals in the role of an attorney are
about adhering to the agreement and recommending a negotiated outcome to their
clients.24  These effects of procedural justice were stronger predictors of
acceptance and enthusiasm for negotiated outcomes than how favorable and how
17. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 94-
95(1975).
18. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 11, at 115-24.
19. Id.
20. Jonathan D. Casper, Tom Tyler & Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 483, 483 (1988). See also Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens'
Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 333, 333 (1988) (examining citizens' perceptions of procedural justice in criminal cases).
21. E. Allan Lind, Carol T. Kulik, Maureen Ambrose & Maria V. de Vera Park, Individual and
Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCi. Q.
224, 235-36 (1993).
22. Dean G. Pruitt, Robert S. Peirce, Neil B. McGillicuddy, Gary L. Welton & Lynn M. Castrianno,
Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 313, 313 (1993); see also Jennic J. Long,
Compliance in Small Claims Court: Exploring the Factors Associated with Defendants' Level of Com-
pliance with Mediated andAdjudicated Outcomes, 21 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 139, 140 (2003).
23. Pruitt ct al., supra note 22, at 321-25.
24. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural
Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473, 478-79
(2008); see also Rebecca E. Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 412-20
(2010) [hereinafter Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation].
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fair the outcomes appeared to the negotiators, suggesting that even in a setting
without a third-party neutral and with minimal procedural and substantive rules,
individuals care about how fairly they are treated.
Procedural justice research does not suggest, however, that people do not care
about either the distributive justice or the favorability of their outcome.25 What
procedural justice research does demonstrate is that the fairness of a process is a
separate, independent construct, distinct from how fair or how good an outcome
is, and that procedural justice has a separate and independent effect on how people
feel about their results, apart from how fair or how good the outcome is. 26 So
while fairness and favorability of outcome do matter, research has consistently
shown that the fairness of the process is an independent driver of satisfaction with
agreements and adherence to them in both judicial and ADR mechanisms. From
the perspective of the legal system, it is especially important that people care
about procedural justice even when they "lose" their case. That is, those who do
not receive what they want or feel that they deserve are nonetheless more likely to
defer to those outcomes if they believe that the outcomes were achieved through
fair procedures.
Psychologists have studied how people form assessments about whether they
have been treated fairly, and there is largely a consensus around the importance of
four critical factors. 27 First, individuals care whether or not they have had an
opportunity to present their own story, a factor that the literature commonly refers
to as voice.28  In the case of a third-party neutral procedure, parties or their
attorneys typically present evidence to a decision maker. Second, people assess
whether or not the decision maker was neutral.29 This involves issues such as
impartiality (lack of bias); the ability to gather and assess the information needed
to make appropriate decisions; openness about the procedure (transparency); and
consistency in the application of rules over people and across time. Third, and
related, is the question of whether or not the third-party authority was
trustworthy.3 Trust is the least overt aspect of fairness because it involves
inferences on the part of the parties that the authority was sincerely trying to do
what was right and was motivated to do what was good for the people involved.
Because trust is an inference, it is shaped by how the authorities act. When the
authorities provide evidence that they have listened to and considered the views of
the parties, and tried to take them into account in thinking about how to respond to
25. Tom R. Tyler, Effective Rule ofLaw, supra note 15, at 292.
26, LIND & TYLER, supra note 16, at 39.
27. Tom Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Justice and Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION
AND CULTURE 295, 300 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004).
28. See, e.g., Robert Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of "Voice " and
Improvement on Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 108, 109 (1977); E.
Allan Lind, Ruth Kafner & P. Christopher Early, Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental
and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 952, 957
(1990); Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski & Nancy Spodick, Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with
Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 80
(1985).
29. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note I1, at 163-64.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 164. Neutrality and trust are related; it would be hard, of course, to trust a biased person.
But the two constructs capture distinct ideas: neutrality refers to the idea that there is some rule-based
approach to the resolution, whereas trust relates to the good motive of the decision maker.
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the issues, they are viewed as more trustworthy. Finally, individuals consider
whether or not they were treated with courtesy and respect.32 This involves both
common respect and courtesy and respect for people's rights. Those rights are
both human rights (treatment with dignity) and legal rights (standing to bring a
case to the authorities and have it treated seriously).
These four factors clearly guide procedural justice assessments about fair
treatment in settings with a third-party decision maker. In other settings where
such a decision maker is not present, research has suggested a strong role for both
voice, and courtesy and respect, and has presented mixed results with respect to
the potential effects of neutrality and trustworthiness.
Theorists have suggested three distinct rationales for the importance of
procedural justice. Originally, Thibaut and Walker believed that people cared
about fairness of process because it would necessarily lead to good and fair
decisions.3 This instrumental theory suggested that people valued fair process
because of its actual effect on bottom-line outcome. Subsequently, Tyler and
Lind provided empirical support for the group engagement model, which
suggested that the instrumental theory was inadequate in accounting for the role
that procedural justice plays.36  Tyler and Lind argued that people care about
fairness of treatment because it provides them with important information about
their status within their group.37 Fair treatment by an authority can reveal that one
is a valued, or not valued, member of a group, which in turn has the potential to
affect one's self-esteem, one's sense of self-worth, and one's social identity. Most
recently, Van den Bos and colleagues have suggested a theory for the reasons
behind procedural justice's importance that fits squarely within the cognitive bias
literature: "fairness heuristic theory" suggests that fairness judgments help to
reduce uncertainty, because individuals rely on procedural justice cues to make
assessments of satisfaction in the absence of distributive justice or outcome
favorability information.38
Procedural justice research suggests not only that people are more satisfied
with the results of a fair decision making process, but also that people are more
likely to defer to the decisions and judgments of an authority, and comply with
those judgments in the long term, when they perceive that the authority has made
those decisions according to a fair process.39  Psychologists have explored the
roots of this increased deference and compliance, and have determined that they
32. Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Bics, Beyond Formal Procedures: The Interpersonal Context of
Procedural Justice, in APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL SETINGS 77, 78 (John
S. Carroll ed., 1990) [hereinafter Tyler & Bies, Beyond Formal Procedures].
33. See Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, supra note 24, at 423.
34. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 17, at 4.
35. Id
36. Tom R. Tyler & Allen A. Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 115, 116-17, 124-37, 144-62 (1992); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of
Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 830, 837
(1989).
37. Tyler & Lind, supra note 36, at 158.
38. Kees Van den Bos, Allen Lind, R. Vermunt & H. Wilke, How Do I Judge My Outcome When I
Do Not Know the Outcome of Others? The Psychology of the Fair Process Effect, 72 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCH. 1034, 1035-36 (1997). Van den Bos and his colleagues suggest that procedural and
distributive justice are far more cognitively linked than previously thought. Id.
39. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 1, 115-23.
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occur because the procedural justice of the decision making process leads them to
conclude that the decision making authority is legitimate40 Psychological
researchers have repeatedly shown that people follow rules when they believe that
the authority that promulgated the rules is legitimate,4' and in turn have also
shown that people think authorities act legitimately when they have experienced
42
procedural justice. In situations where individuals feel that a decision maker is
neutral, trustworthy, has given them the opportunity for voice, and has treated
them with courtesy and respect, they are more likely to feel that the process was
procedurally just, and in turn, that the decision maker has legitimate authority and
that they ought to defer to that decision maker.43
For example, in one study, Tyler explored the question of whether individuals
largely made assessments about legitimacy based on whether they received a
favorable outcome or on whether they received procedural justice.44 In particular,
he examined the question of whether relational treatment that had the potential to
affect participants' sense of status within their group played a role in assessment
of legitimacy. 45 His results suggested that the relational factors dominated the
instrumental factors: a regression analysis showed that the relational factors had
almost twice the effect as the instrumental factors.46
Because a system of command and control, with reliance on complete
surveillance, enforcement, and punishment, is not feasible in a society of our size
and complexity, a system of voluntary deference to authority is critical to the
functioning of society. It is therefore important to recognize that such deference
can be affected by the degree of procedural justice-and thus legitimacy-
experienced by individuals. When individuals feel that authorities are making
decisions in procedurally fair ways, they view the authorities as more legitimate
and are more willing to defer to the authorities' decisions.47 Less command and
control is needed, and individuals can rely more on self-regulation in settings
where authorities act in procedurally fair ways. The legitimacy of government
authorities is central to the ability of government to function; so too, the
legitimacy of dispute resolution systems is fundamental in gaining individuals'
voluntary deference to the resolution of their disputes and preventing them from
engaging in self-help measures that undermine social stability.
40. Id. at 115.
41. Id. at 19-57, 115; see also Margaret Levi, Audrey Sacks & Tom Tyler, Conceptualizing Legiti-
macy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs, 53 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIsT 354, 359-60 (2009) (arguing that
when governments use fair procedures, citizens are more likely to view those governments as legiti-
mate and worthy of deference).
42. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note t 1. I15-23.
43. Id. at 115-34.
44. See e.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective on Voluntary
Deference to Authorities, I PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCH. REv. 323, 323-24 (1997).
45. Id. at 325.
46. Id. at 334 (finding the beta weights of relational factors to be 0.5, while those of instrumental
factors were 0.2).
47. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note I1, 115-23.
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B. The Rule ofLaw and Procedural Justice
The term "rule of law" has been used so much, and in so many different
ways, that it is almost an impossible target to pin down in a single satisfying
way.48 Scholars have defined rule of law in different ways at different times, and
the term's definitions are not all mutually compatible.49 Most scholars agree on at
least the "thinnest" description of rule of law that requires government actors and
citizens to be bound by and act consistently with law.50  This formalist view
requires that law be set forth in advance, and be general, clear, stable, and applied
consistently to everyone.51 Many theorists who advocate for this definition of the
rule of law believe that these requirements foster individual autonomy and dignity,
but this definition does not mandate that the law itself carry substantive
components enshrining any particular individual rights. That is, the formalist
definition does not include any required substantive content. This formalist
definition of the rule of law fits well with procedural justice ideas of neutrality,
because it requires that decisions be made impartially and through the consistent
application of legal rules and the consideration of facts. Additionally, because this
definition helps to promote dignity and respect for citizens through procedure, it
dovetails with the procedural justice elements of treatment with courtesy and
respect.
Some theorists have suggested that there is a substantive component of rule of
law as well, that must include respect for individual rights. For example, Dworkin
suggested that the rule of law included the capture and enforcement through law
of moral rights of individuals. Others have gone farther, arguing that the rule of
law includes social welfare principles as well.54 These substantive components of
the rule of law are controversial, perhaps in part because individuals may not
share the same perspective on what constitute moral rights. Procedural justice
expressly does not include distributive justice, which separates the concerns of
procedural justice from the protection of substantive individual rights.
Nonetheless, the substantive definition of rule of law shares with procedural
justice the core idea that people should have both their rights, as individuals and
their rights as citizens with standing in a community, recognized.
Historically, the concept of rule of law developed as protection from tyranny
by government, and one important theoretical conception of rule of law is as a
48. See Tamanaha, Concise Guide, supra note 5, at 3 ("Notwithstanding its quick and remarkable
ascendance as a global ideal, however, the rule of law, is an exceedingly elusive notion.").
49. Id. (noting that political and legal theorists "often hold vague or sharply contrasting understand-
ings of the rule of law.").
50. Id at 3.
51. Id. See also Jeremy Waldron, The Rule ofLaw and the Importance ofProcedure 1-3 (New York
Univ. Sch. of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-73, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1688491.
52. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 9, at 94 (noting that Raz, Fuller, Unger, and
Hayek all share this vision of the rule of law).
53. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1-3 (1986).
54. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 9, at 113.
55. Id. (noting that "[t]he rule of law cannot be about everything good that people desire from their
government"); see also Waldron, supra note 51, at 2 (explaining that "I am not as hostile as I once was
to a substantive conception of [the rule of law] ideal.") (citation omitted).
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defense of individuals against government overreaching.56 The rule of law has
also been envisioned as a formal structure to protect individual liberty, as noted
above.57 Finally, still others have taken a functional perspective on the definition
of the rule of law, suggesting that the basic "rule of law, not man" axiom stands
for the limitation of government officials' complete discretion and flexibility.",
The law provides a way for individual government authorities, such as judges, to
make fair rulings, rather than using their own set of criteria for decision making.
Adherence to legal rules, as noted above, fits well with the procedural justice
criterion of neutrality and impartial decision making. Additionally, limiting
discretion, although not directly considered in the procedural justice literature,
may be a factor in promoting trust of authorities.59 For the purposes of this essay,
we need not take sides in the lively debate over the meaning or theoretical
underpinnings of rule of law; it is sufficient for our purposes to take a pluralist
point of view and acknowledge these different understandings.
On its face, a venerable historical tradition of the rule of law to protect
individuals from government tyranny seems quite different than subjective
perceptions of fairness by individuals. A closer look suggests, instead, that the
rule of law and psychological perceptions of fairness may share an inextricable,
symbiotic relationship. Indeed, our psychological inclinations to value fair
process, and our assessments about what factors create a fair process, may be the
original drivers of rule of law principles. In turn, the design of the system of rule
of law to protect individuals from tyranny may then provide us with a helpful
template for what fair process looks like as we form our psychological perceptions
of procedural justice: the foundational concepts of the rule of law may help
people in making individual determinations about what behavior is fair.
There are important differences in the constructs, however: whereas the rule
of law requires the use of specific principles that are set forth in some formal
system of law, procedural justice, as noted above, is not about the use of any
particular set of rules. Instead, it is an assessment of the fairness of a decision
making process that relies on individuals' judgments about their voice, the
courtesy and respect with which they are treated, and the neutrality and
trustworthiness of the decision maker. As measured by psychologists, procedural
justice is not about substantive rule application. Indeed, the effects of procedural
justice have been felt in settings with few, if any, substantive rules to apply. For
instance, in our study of legal negotiation, procedural justice was found to have an
effect on acceptance of agreements even though there are almost no rules that
govern legal negotiation. 60
And yet procedural justice and the rule of law share a central focus on
providing legitimacy to decision makers. The rule of law fosters legitimacy by
equally applying fixed law to all individuals and, in some definitions, respecting
56. Tamanaha, Concise Guide, supra note 5, at 8.
57. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 9, at 113.
58. Id. at 123.
59. It is clear, though, that people evaluate the motivations that shape the exercise of discretion. If
people believe that authorities' actions are guided by benevolent intentions, they are more likely to
judge them to be consistent with fair procedures. So, a departure from rules may be viewed as fair or
unfair depending upon why people think it has occurred.
60. See Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, supra note 24, at 402, 423; see also infra text accom-
panying notes 105-106.
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individuals' rights. Procedural justice promotes legitimacy by giving individuals
a neutral and trustworthy decision maker, allowing them a voice, and treating
them with courtesy and respect. Some of these values map onto one another quite
nicely: for example, how better might a decision maker act neutral but through
applying fixed law equally to all parties? Similarly, such adherence to the rule of
law by applying law neutrally gives rise to perceptions that the authority is
trustworthy. Additionally, the trustworthiness and neutrality of a decision maker
may be judged by whether the finding is based on facts and evidence. Because the
legal system in the United States is adversarial and relies on parties to present
their own evidence, this in turn links voice and an opportunity to be heard with
principles of rule of law. So too, providing voice in legal proceedings is one way
to manifest respect for individual rights; treating parties with courtesy and respect
similarly demonstrates respect for those rights.
Procedural justice researchers have suggested a distinction among the factors
that lead to judgments about procedural justice, identifying (1) decision making
factors, which include neutrality and voice, and (2) interpersonal factors, which
include trust and personal respect.6 ' This distinction leads to another way to
conceptualize the relationship between procedural justice and the rule of law:
classic formalist rule of law features tend to best be analogized with the former
group, while the relational factors best speak to the individual rights component of
rule of law, even though they do not guarantee any substantive rights per se.
Although the interpersonal elements of procedural justice may appear to be
more attenuated from formalist rule of law principles, this relationship can be seen
through a different lens: when one takes a broader view, the entire function of
having a rule of law is to make sure that people are treated fairly in society.
Individuals care about tyranny of the government because they care about how
people are treated.
In the history of the psychological study of procedures, early work by Thibaut
and Walker focused upon decision making fairness, i.e. voice and neutrality.62
They found in experimental studies that disputants were concerned about the
fairness of decision making and that that concern was distinct from their reactions
to the outcome. However, subsequent field studies of both trials and alternative
procedures showed that people's procedural concerns extended beyond this more
formal definition of procedural justice.6" They included elements of interpersonal
treatment, such as courtesy and respect for rights.65  In addition, whether
disputants said that they trusted the authority that was making decisions played an
important role in reactions to the decisions, and trust was shaped by both decision
making and interpersonal treatment.6" As a consequence of these findings,
subsequent models of procedural justice have expanded to include both issues of
decision making and interpersonal treatment.
Empirical research has suggested that there is a meaningful connection
between assessments about the rule of law and procedural justice judgments. In a
61. Tylcr & Bics, Beyond Formal Procedures, supra note 32, at 77-78.
62. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 34, at ch. 9.
63. Id
64. LIND & TYLER, supra note 16, at 107-110.
65. Id. at 109.
66. Tyler & Lind, supra note 36, at 142.
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study of California citizens' interactions with the police or the courts, Tyler and
Huo found evidence supporting a two-stage model where elements of rule of law
shape judgments about procedural justice and trust, and this in turn then
influences willingness to defer to authority.67 Tyler and Huo developed indices to
measure rule of law values; the indices included elements of rule-based decision
making (whether the authority allowed them to tell their story, made decisions
neutrally, applied rules consistently, and acted transparently), respect for rights
(whether decisions were consistent with law, and whether authorities
acknowledged and were concerned about individual rights), and respect for
persons (treating people with respect, courtesy, and dignity).6 For individuals
dealing with courts, these judgments about rule of law accounted for 73 percent of
the variance in assessments about procedural justice, 79 percent of the variance in
trust, and 80 percent of the variance in deference to the courts. 69 For individuals
dealing with police, judgments about the rule of law accounted for 75 percent of
the variance in procedural justice judgments, 83 percent of the variance in trust,
and 84 percent of the variance in deference.70 Each of these analyses was also
conducted including judgments about outcome as one of the potential explanatory
factors; in each case, outcome was almost completely irrelevant,71 suggesting that
"people react to their experiences largely in terms of the degree to which they
judged that the authorities did or did not act in terms of the ideas underlying the
rule of law."7
In another analysis, this time with data from New York City residents and
their opinions about the police, Tyler found that judgments about the rule of law
explained 37 percent of the variance in judgments about the procedural justice of
police behavior, and 65 percent of the variance in judgments about trust of the
police. In turn, procedural justice and trust explained 22 percent of the variance
in general deference to and support for the police, and when factors that included
the quality of police performance were added in, the extra explanatory power was
minimal.74  That is, procedural justice and trust judgments, rather than
performance assessment, were the primary factors driving deference to and
support for the police; in turn, rule of law judgments accounted for a significant
portion of how individuals made their assessments of procedural justice. The rule
of law factors also had a direct impact on deference to the police, accounting for
27 percent of the deference."s These findings suggested that general deference to
67. Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psychologi-
cal Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 661, 669 (2007) (using data collected for
ToM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE
POLICE AND COURTS 28 (2002)).
68. Id. at 671-72.
69. Id. at 673.
70. Id.
71. For example, in an analysis that added judgments about outcomes to the predicate factors in the
courts context, the amount of variance did not increase for procedural justice and trust at all, and in-
creased by only one percent for deference. Id. Results were similar in the police context. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural
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legal authority is shaped in large part by assessments about whether the authorities
are adhering to the rule of law.
According to these findings, individuals perceive decisions as legitimate, and
therefore appropriate to defer to, when they experience procedural justice as well
as when the decision processes embody rule of law values. These constructs are
not completely overlapping, but they are also not fully distinct. The research
suggests that rule of law judgments play an important role in influencing
procedural justice judgments, and also may have an independent effect on
deference to authority.
IH1. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE & THE RULE OF LAW IN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
As noted above, there has been grave concern about ADR processes and
whether they a Propriately protect individuals' rights and comport with rule of
law principles. ADR processes include the very distinct mechanisms of
arbitration, mediation, and negotiation. These processes all share in common that
they are more informal processes for the resolution of a dispute than a lawsuit
before a court; although there are rules that govern each of these dispute
resolution mechanisms, they are all indisputably less rule-based than litigation.
Indeed, the popular success of ADR has largely been due to its informal, non-rule
based processes that are designed for an efficiency that necessarily implies a
tradeoff in rules, enforcement, and judicial oversight."
Yet these dispute resolution processes are also very different from one
another. Despite the fact that they have been grouped together under the umbrella
term of ADR, they are unique and often appear to have more differences than
similarities. For example, while arbitration produces a final and binding decision
by a third-party neutral, is reviewable by a court, and is typically the product of a
contractual agreement to arbitrate, negotiated outcomes do not involve a third
party neutral, are not subject to court review, and can be freely chosen or
rejected.79 Mediation, which has more rules than negotiation but fewer than
arbitration, is a process that is conducted by a third-party neutral who has no
authority to bind the parties and, although it is not subject to any court review, is
often the product of a mandate from a judge sending the parties to mediation.
At the same time that critics have attacked ADR for failing to protect
individual rights,80 supporters have suggested that ADR has tremendous potential
for fulfilling the procedural justice needs of individual disputants.81 Procedural
justice effects have been found in all three of these ADR settings, and indeed,
some have suggested that parties' preferences for certain types of ADR are
actually driven by procedural justice assessments about these processes being
76. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 559,564(2001).
78. The scope of this review is quite narrow, however. See infra notes 83-85.
79. See Hollandcr-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, supra note 24, at 406.
80. See Edwards, supra note 3, at 679.
81. See Sternlight, supra note 4, at 576.
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more fair than litigation.82 These findings suggest that individuals essentially may
"vote with their feet" and, to the extent that procedural justice matters to them,
take their disputes to forums where their procedural justice needs will be met. To
the extent that this is true, and that parties want to engage in ADR because it
appears more procedurally fair to them than traditional judicial decision making,
the procedural justice parties experience in these processes may be a key facet of
making these processes legitimate. When these processes appear legitimate
because of individuals' subjective assessments about fairness, the processes at
least comport with the aims, if not necessarily the specific elements, of the rule of
law.
However, the "vote with their feet" perspective may ignore important power
differentials and constraints in choosing the forum for the resolution of one's
dispute. For example, arbitration is often mandated in contracts of adhesion
between large, powerful corporations and small individuals who do not fully
understand what rights they are giving up. Similarly, courts often require parties
to engage in court-annexed mediation; parties with limited resources and pressing
financial needs may feel pressure to resolve their dispute in mediation even
though they might prefer the case resolved by the judge. Because of the potential
for constrained choice, a simple suggestion that individuals will not use a dispute
resolution mechanism unless they experience it as procedurally just is not enough.
However, procedural justice still provides a critical perspective. Even if an
individual might prefer a different dispute resolution mechanism on procedural
justice grounds, any given mechanism can appear more or less fair to an
individual. In looking at each type of dispute resolution mechanism, one can
consider what factors would ensure that the process was perceived as more, rather
than less, procedurally fair. In each ADR process, even in the absence of rule of
law elements per se, then, system designers can work to bolster the procedural
justice an individual experiences, so that the process can be as fair as possible.
ADR will never-by conscious design-be the same as a pronouncement by a
judge, with the full heft of the rule of law. But when elements of each ADR
process are crafted to ensure maximum procedural justice for participants, they
will experience the process as more legitimate and worthy of deference; again,
this legitimacy may help to keep the ADR processes in sync with the aims of the
rule of law.
In the sections below, we consider each ADR process separately, exploring
the role of procedural justice and the rule of law in that setting.
A. Arbitration
Of each of the ADR processes, arbitration looks most similar to traditional
litigation. Arbitration is faster and more efficient; in exchange, the parties lose
some important procedural protections. Although courts maintain the right to
82. See generally Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants' Preferences for Dispute Resolu-
tion Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REv. 63 (2008);
Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer, Modem
Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 211 (2004); see also Allan Lind, Yuen Huo & Tom
Tyler, . . .And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedures,
18 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 269, 286-87 (1994).
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review an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the standard
for review is extremely narrow.83 Grounds for a court's refusal to confirm an
award include, among other things, an award based on corruption, fraud, or
misconduct,84 and grounds for modification or correction of an award include
evident material miscalculation, evident material mistake, and imperfections in
matter of form not affecting the merits. In a recent case, the Supreme Court
found that parties could not widen the scope of judicial review under the FAA
even by contract.86 Indeed, even the validity of the long-used judicial standard
that allowed judges to vacate an arbitrator's decision if it was made in "manifest
disregard of the law" is currently uncertain.87
Additionally, courts have made it clear that parties in arbitration require less
procedural protection than parties in court. Arbitration is a private, contractual
arrangement about how to resolve a dispute, and courts have been reluctant to
interfere with that arrangement. So, for example, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,88 the Supreme Court upheld the enforcement of an agreement to
arbitrate claims arising from an employment agreement, and demonstrated only
minimal concern about the procedural aspects of the arbitral process. However,
Gilmer did require some minimum level of judicial oversight to protect due
process, even as it denied special procedural protections in the arbitration
context.89
Taken together, the protections for parties in arbitration offer a nod in the
direction of rule of law, but fail to promote rule of law values in the same way that
judicial proceedings are designed to do. Pro-arbitration commentators suggest
that the market process controls, and people will not freely choose to include
agreements to arbitrate disputes in their contracts if the arbitration process is
manifestly unfair." In contrast, other scholars suggest that the absence of full
information on both sides, and the typical power differential between the parties,
means that arbitration has the potential to be quite unfair.9'
Ensuring that participants in arbitration experience high degrees of procedural
justice may provide a way to ameliorate this tension between arbitration and rule
of law. Because arbitration looks so structurally similar to litigation, the same
factors that individuals use to assess procedural justice in judicial proceedings
ought to be applicable in arbitration. Thus voice, trustworthiness, neutrality, and
courtesy and respect will be the key elements in determining whether or not
participants experience procedural justice. While arbitrators ought to easily be
able to increase parties' perception of voice, and courteous and respectful
83. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C §§ 10, 11 (2010) (limiting grounds on basis of which
courts may refuse to enforce awards).
84. See FAA § 10.
85. See FAA § 11.
86. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
87. See Stolt-Nidlsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n. 3 (2010)
("We do not decide whether 'manifest disregard' survives our decision in Hall Street Associates . . .
(citation omitted)).
88, 500 U.S. 20,31 (1991).
89, Id. at 32.
90. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Con-
tractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 195, 201 (1998).
91. See Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631,
1632-34 (2005).
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treatment, a consideration of trustworthiness and neutrality suggests a more
structural reform. Many arbitration panels are chosen from a set list of arbitrators,
often a list proffered by one party. Although courts do intervene when the panel
of arbitrators appears to be exceptionally biased,92 a closer look at arbitration
through the lens of procedural justice suggests that attacks on the neutrality and
trustworthiness of the arbitrator-a hallmark of challenges to arbitration
proceedings--ought to be taken more seriously. Shoring up the elements of
procedural justice in arbitration will help the process comport with rule of law
values.
B. Mediation
Although mediation dates to antiquity,93 mediation in the United States
experienced tremendous growth in prominence in the late 1970s and 1980s, as it
became a popular way in which to try to reduce burdens on overloaded courts.94
The mediation that grew out of this effort was also envisioned by many of its
proponents as a way to empower participants and ensure them both process and
decision control, core elements of procedural justice.95 In particular, this type of
mediation was based on each party having an extensive opportunity for voice, and
the forum was designed to foster courtesy and respect among the parties and the
mediator.96 The mediator was envisioned as a completely neutral and trustwort
third party whose sole role was to facilitate the parties' resolution of conflict.
Although mediation was expressly not required to comport with legal rules and
principles," its conceptual basis as a party-empowering mechanism provided
parties with high levels of procedural justice. In turn, this led to a sense of
92. Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999).
93. Peter J. Carnevale & Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation and Mediation, 43 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 531, 561
(1992); see also David Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod Aeschylus and
Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279, 280 (1987) (describing Greek approaches to achieving "justice" and
"reconciliation"); F.S.C. Northrup, The Mediational Approval Theory of Law in American Legal Real-
ism, 44 VA. L. REv. 347, 349 (1958) (describing Chinese philosophy in which mediation was the "first
best" way to settle disputes).
94. ALAN Scorr RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCorr R. PEPPET, MEDIATION AND OTHER NON-
BINDING ADR PROCESSES 7 (3d ed. 2006); see also Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda
for Civil Justice Reforms in the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553, 1570 (1994).
95. Raymond Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work, Structure, and Guiding Principles, 5
MEDIATION Q. 3, 14-16, 18-23 (1984).
96. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving
Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 11, 40-47 (1984) (finding that a higher percen-
tage of parties comply with mediated settlements than with court-ordered judgments).
97. Richard Posner, Mediation, American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution, II'h An-
nual Frank E.A. Sander Program: The 21' Century Lawyer: Problem Solver or Case Processor?
(July 8, 2000), in MEDIATION AND OTHER NON-BINDING ADR PROCESSES, supra note 94, at 49.
Posner describes a mediator as "a neutral third party who, unlike arbitrator (a private judge), has no
decisional power." Id. He further states:
Since the mediator can meet with the parties separately and his discussions with them are confidential,
they are likely to be more candid with him than they would be with each other. . . . He can thus help
them converge to a common estimate of the likely outcome of the case if it is litigated to judgment.
Id.
98. See Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308 (1971)
("[Tihere is no pre-existing structure that can guide mediation; it is the meditational process that pro-
duces the structure.").
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legitimacy that could enable it to appear to comport with the rule of law even as it
enabled the crafting of creative and extra-legal solutions to disputes.
This cheerful vision of mediation has been attacked on several grounds. First,
critics have suggested that some disputes are not appropriate for mediation
because of the power dynamics between the parties." For example, some scholars
have argued that domestic disputes in cases where violence has occurred ought not
to be the subject of mediation.'" Secondly, as mediation has grown dramatically
in popularity, the mediation mechanism itself has changed. So, for example,
Welsh describes a thinning vision of self-determination of mediation,'0
suggesting that mediation used to look more voice-driven and more self-
deterministic, but now looks increasingly like another kind of litigation in which,
while the mediator cannot give parties a binding decision, the decision can be
strongly guiding. 0 2
The former criticism suggests that power differentials may mean that
mediation is simply an inappropriate forum for some subset of cases in which the
potential for party coercion dictates that individual rights cannot be adequately
protected without the binding authority of a third-party neutral. In contrast, the
latter critique of mediation is perhaps less of a worry for those concerned with the
rule of law, because it promotes rule-based decision making rather than interest
based decision making. But in this narrow vision, some of the self-determination
benefit of mediation is lost, from ADR theorists' perspective.' 03  Procedural
justice as a framework implies that the shift in focus away from rules has related
benefits because parties have increased voice, trust, and courtesy and respect, even
if they are losing more of the neutral decision maker.
Both court-annexed "narrow" mediation and more party-empowering
mediation have the potential to satisfy parties' needs for procedural justice.
However, each type of mediation will have distinct effects on the procedural
justice factors. For example, if one expects voice to be a privileged element of
mediation, and it is not, the process becomes a softer, less formal version of
litigation that may still meet one's criteria for fair process in other ways.
However, if parties evaluate each of the antecedent factors of procedural justice
based on their prior expectations, parties may be disappointed. Psychological
research suggests that individuals make evaluations from some reference point
rather than from a neutral starting point,'10 so that these prior expectations may
result in lower procedural justice evaluations. This suggests that one key element
in ensuring the procedural justice of mediation is setting expectations clearly from
the outset about the type of mediation in which parties will participate, which in
turn will help mediation appear in sync with rule of law values.
99. See, e.g., Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1549 (1991) (arguing that mediation does not provide enough procedural protections in this
context).
100, Id at 1584-85.
101. Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision ofSelf-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The
Inevitable Price ofinstitutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 5 (2001).
102. Id. at 25-26.
103. Id.
104. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 285-87 (1979).
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C Negotiation
Negotiation is the least formal of our dispute resolution mechanisms. Parties
are free to negotiate, not negotiate, agree on any resolution or no resolution, craft
their agreement to fully reflect the dictates of the law, or disregard the law
entirely. Although Mnookin and Kornhauser have suggested that we bargain in
the shadow of law and that our negotiated outcomes are likely to reflect the legal
endowments that legal rules provide,'05 there is wide variation in negotiated
outcomes, even when the legal rules are similar.'" Often, parties are uncertain
about the correct interpretation of legal rules, and many negotiated outcomes do
not comport with one party's or both parties' prediction of how a court would
rule. Additionally, parties may negotiate in any form they choose. They need not
adhere to any structure as they work through the substance of their negotiation. 07
In this way, negotiation appears worlds apart from the formalist and substantive
rule of law.
In our research on procedural justice in negotiation, however, we discovered
that individuals cared about the fairness of a negotiation process, separate and
apart from their economic outcome or their perception of the fairness of the
outcome.1os Even though there are no set rules for negotiation to which parties
must adhere, and even though the law may provide little neutral guidance to
parties as they work to privately settle their dispute, our research demonstrated
that individuals nonetheless are more likely to accept and adhere to a negotiated
agreement when they believe that the negotiation was conducted in a fair
manner. '0 In a negotiation setting, individuals form judgments about whether or
not they were treated fairly by assessing whether or not they were afforded a
voice, were treated with courtesy and respect, and trusted the other party- 0
Thus, while it might initially seem that an informal procedure such as
negotiation which lacks a third party would not be defined by participants in
procedural justice terms, empirical data suggests that individuals are strongly
affected by the fairness of process even in this type of setting. Indeed, studies
suggest that people's evaluations of a wide variety of procedures are shaped in
these terms. For example, studies suggest that people evaluate the justice of
economic markets as much in procedural justice terms as in terms of the
favorability of the outcomes they produce."'
105. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.. 950,950 (1979).
106. See, e.g., Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 24, at 490 (finding that participants achieved a
broad range of outcomes despite the fact that the legal framework and fact pattern were held constant);
see also Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, supra note 24, at 383 (explaining there are few rules for
lawyer's conduct during the negotiation process).
107. For a discussion about the paucity of rules governing behavior during negotiation, see Hollan-
der-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, supra note 24, at 391.
108. See Hollander-Blumoff& Tyler, supra note 24, at 476.
109. Id. at 477.
110. Neutrality is a more complicated concept in the bilateral negotiation context. For further discus-
sion, see Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, supra note 24, at 390-91.
111. Harris Sondak & Tom Tyler, How Does Procedural Justice Shape the Desirability of Markets?,
28 J. ECON. PSYCH. 79, 79 (2007).
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The fact that people care about procedural justice even in legal negotiation
suggests that we may need to be less worried about negotiation existing wholly
outside the reach of rule of law principles. Although the negotiation process does
not technically come within the ambit of rule of law because it does not apply
neutral principles directly to facts and does not adhere to any set procedural form,
participants nonetheless appear to evaluate negotiation through a fairness of
process lens, suggesting that negotiations that comport with rule of law values will
be more successful than those that do not.
Because procedural justice fosters perceptions of legitimacy, and because the
bulk of our legal disputes are resolved through negotiation, the more procedurally
fair our negotiations appear, the more legitimate our legal system appears. To this
end, procedural justice again offers a way to bolster the legitimacy of our legal
system. When fair processes lead to results that both parties are willing to accept,
those results will be perceived as legitimate and will be given deference. Even
when negotiated results are not the express product of the rule of law-as
negotiated agreements, by definition, are not-they can still coexist harmoniously
with the system of the rule of law when they are achieved through procedurally
just processes.
Certainly, not all legal negotiation will perfectly reflect principles of
procedural justice. However, the greater success of more procedurally just
negotiations, through increased acceptance and adherence of outcomes, both
provides an instrumental benefit that can encourage participants to act in ways that
are procedurally fair and offers some measure of comfort that many negotiated
outcomes do give parties an experience that contains some procedural justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is a well-worn trope that there is a spectrum of dispute resolution, with
arbitration closest to judicial decision making, negotiation farthest from it, and
mediation somewhere in between. Despite the tremendous structural differences
between these processes, research has suggested that in each process, disputants
care about fairness of process, and that people prefer and choose ADR processes
and rate them highly, especially when they think they get fair treatment." 2
Studies also show that procedural justice is one factor that drives people in their
choice of dispute resolution mechanisms.
Because there is considerable conceptual overlap between rule of law
principles and procedural justice, and because they both foster perceptions of
legitimacy, perhaps concerns over the lack of rule of law values in ADR are
overblown, because people will not chose ADR or accept its outcomes if it does
not provide the desired rule of law and procedural justice benefits. That is, to the
extent that people's procedural justice needs are met in ADR, one might say that
these processes are occurring, in an echo of the words of Mnookin and
Kornhauser, in the shadow of the rule of law." 3
However, the implication of a top-down mechanism is not fully accurate.
Rule of law does not necessarily cast its shadow on ADR as a guiding influence;
112. See infra text accompanying note 82.
113. Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 105, at 950.
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instead, the rule of law may merely embody the principles that individuals desire
in dispute resolution systems. Thus, even though the rule of law is enshrined in
formal settings and not in informal settings, individuals still look for its core
principles whenever there are disputes to be decided or resources to allocate.
Indeed, as noted above, procedural justice has even been found to play a role in
how people evaluate markets."l4 This explanation helps to explain the seeming
contradiction that people may prefer ADR to litigation. Individuals want the
benefits of looser process but still expect or want the rule of law and elements that
foster procedural justice too. Understanding that people value fairness in these
processes can provide researchers and theorists a measure of comfort that
procedural justice helps bridge the gap that may exist between ADR and rule of
law-that procedural justice may ameliorate the potential tensions between the
two ideals.
But this does ignore a very real problem: some individuals are constrained in
their choice of processes, whether by unequal market or bargaining power, socio-
cultural constraints, geographic restrictions, or level of access to different
systems."'5 It is simply not sufficient to suggest that these individuals would not
agree to participate in a particular process if they did not find it fair. But what
research does suggest is that they would value procedural justice if they could get
it, and that procedural justice would add to the legitimacy of the decision reached
in their dispute." 6  For these populations especially, it is critical to focus on
several key questions about ADR processes. What are the means by which we
can make our ADR processes match people's procedural justice needs? What are
the best ways to make each ADR process better from a procedural justice
perspective? How can legislators, lawyers, and other actors strengthen
perceptions of the fairness of process even in non-rule based decision making
systems, in order to further the aims of rule of law and legitimate governance?
These are important questions that we have touched on briefly, above, and that
creators of dispute resolution systems need to take seriously in order to maintain
legitimacy for all participants.
114. See Sondak & Tyler, supra note 115, at 79.
115. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Prefe-
rence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 637, 682-83 (1996).
116. See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note I1, at 172.
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